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Rhodes: Florida’s Growth Management Odyssey

FLORIDA’S GROWTH MANAGEMENT ODYSSEY: REVOLUTION,
EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION…..RESOLUTION
Robert M. Rhodes*
I have enjoyed reading Homer’s epic poem The Odyssey. It is an allegory
of struggle and perseverance that offers enduring insights and encouragement for
anyone engaged in adventures and intellectual quests. I expect my friend Dr.
Juergensmeyer has often identified with Odysseus’ challenges over his 55 years
of distinguished teaching and administration. I know I have.
An odyssey is a long, often difficult voyage or quest with many changes in
fortune. It is an apt description of Florida’s almost half century effort to manage
its growth by enacting various state initiated legislation and related directives.
My goal is to relate the Florida story with special emphasis on what I
consider its distinctive feature and the key institutional driver of its growth
management program, the state’s role.1 Why focus on the state’s role?
Balanced state policy and oversight are central to Florida’s
intergovernmental planning program. Policy establishes state goals that should be
reflected in local planning and development decisions. Oversight provides the
teeth, some call it the hammer or watch dog, for implementing and enforcing the
state program. When properly articulated and applied, policy driven oversight can
provide local government’s policy context, sound process, tools and sometimes
political cover and support to make difficult decisions. A state framework can
also infuse a measure of uniformity into Florida’s myriad of local land use
planning programs.2 It can provide a degree of desirable certainty that benefits
all participants in planning decisions and enhances Florida’s economic
development prospects.3
Note I said a state program can accomplish these aims. Over the years,
attainment has been irregular, primarily due to the philosophy and politics of the
state leadership at the time and consequent budget and statutory policy.
To better understand Florida’s odyssey, here is a snapshot history of our
state and local planning program.4
*

Former administrator of Florida’s growth management program and Chairman, State of Florida
Second Environmental and Land Management Study Committee. Practitioner in Residence,
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REVOLUTION
Florida has an enduring home rule tradition.5 True to this legacy, since the
late 1960s Florida cities and counties enjoyed broad discretion to adopt local land
use plans and regulations, and if they did, determine their character and legal
status. But in the early ‘70s, facing a firestorm of environmental, infrastructure
and other public service crises and a crushing number of new residents to the
state, the Florida Legislature joined what Fred Bosselman and David Callies
called “The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Controls.” 6 By joining the revolution,
the state broke with tradition and recouped some of the power and discretion
previously delegated to localities to plan and regulate land use.
The early ‘70s legislative products included the development of regional
impact program, which required intergovernmental review of large-scale
development and infrastructure projects that would impact the citizens of more
than one county.7 An area of critical state concern program granted the state
authority to impose state planning goals and local regulations on especially
sensitive and threatened environmental resource areas. 8 Later, a state appointed
work group, the First Environmental Land Management Study Committee, known
as ELMS I, took the lead in developing and the Legislature enacted the state’s
first mandatory local planning program, the 1975 Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act.9
The local planning act was an important milestone that poured a
foundation for later legislation, but was not a startling success. Working with a
broadly worded state mandate to produce local comprehensive plans with minimal
state guidance, little technical and financial assistance, and no penalties for noncompliance, many local governments adopted loosely worded, internally
inconsistent advisory plans. Future land use maps were optional and often too
politically sensitive to produce. Although state policy required consistency
between plans and development approvals, this policy was largely ignored.
As a result, the first planning act produced more local plans, but no
meaningful statewide improvement in planning and growth management practice.
EVOLUTION
Concern in the early ‘80s about the ineffectiveness of the local planning
act prompted appointment of the Second Environmental Land Management Study
Committee to assess the state’s growth management effort.
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ELMS II concluded if Florida wants effective growth management, the
state must take the lead, chart a policy course, and then effectively administer its
programs. In short: the state must actively engage. 10
The Governor and Legislature agreed with the bulk of ELMS II
recommendations and legislation was enacted over a two year period that directed
production of a state comprehensive policy plan and statutory guidelines for
regional councils to develop regional policy plans.11 These plans would pour the
foundation in 1985 for the state’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning
and Development Regulation Act, known as the growth management act or
GMA.12 Among other action, the GMA called for the state to adopt minimum
uniform standards for local plans and amendments which would be enforced
through state compliance decisions; possible state sanctions for non-complying
localities; an adequate public facilities policy that required certain services and
facilities be available to serve new growth concurrent with the impacts of this
growth, popularly called concurrency; a frequency limit for amendments to local
plans; a requirement that plans be consistent with the state comprehensive plan
and regional policy plans and implemented by local land development
regulations; expansive public notice provisions for adoption of plans and
amendments; and rights for citizens to challenge administratively state
compliance decisions. The GMA also reaffirmed an earlier requirement that local
development approvals be consistent with adopted local plans and provided
certain citizens and groups a judicial remedy to enforce this consistency policy.
The GMA energized the state program and ultimately produced workable
and moderately effective growth management. All local governments eventually
adopted plans that were found in compliance with state standards.
During the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, first and second generation state
growth management programs, DRIs and the GMA, were formidable statewide
proscribers and prescribers for local plans and large projects. But not surprisingly,
these major state intrusions on traditional local prerogative generated criticism
and a measure of reproval from both urban and rural localities and some in the
building industries. The state’s urban sprawl policy, concurrency, which was
never properly funded by state or local governments, a vague and unpredictable
policy requiring an assessment of “need” and economic feasibility of new projects
and the scope and extent of DRI exactions were special lightning rods for GMA
opposition. This growing criticism, plus the fact the state program was relatively
new and expected to evolve with experience prompted another major
reassessment of Florida’s state program by the Third Environmental Land
Management Study Committee, ELMS III.
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DEVOLUTION
Jerry Weitz describes several waves or stages in the development and
evolution of state growth management programs.13 The fourth wave contemplates
characteristics especially pertinent to Florida’s more recent experience: erosion
of early mandate driven state planning and regulatory programs, greater flexibility
for localities to implement state programs and less rigid state application of
uniform state rules, statutory and rule revisions without benefit of evaluation, and
the ascendancy of greater intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration. 14
True to the fourth wave, ELMS III concluded that because local
governments had developed compliance plans and most had enacted
implementing land development regulations, rigid adherence to uniform state
standards and program mandates was not desirable or practical. 15 The Legislature
agreed and in the early ‘90s, the state’s oversight role was loosened and certain
small scale amendments were exempted from state review and ultimately phased
out and urban areas were granted flexibility to apply state compliance standards
to local plan amendments.
State oversight continued to be loosened in the 2000s. In 2007, the
Legislature established a pilot alternative review project that fast tracked and
streamlined state review of plan amendments in urban areas.16 The project cut
review time in half and focused state review on issues of state and regional
importance. In 2009, this alternative state review process was authorized
statewide for plan amendments that would encourage urban redevelopment. 17
Additionally, urban areas were granted flexibility to satisfy transportation
concurrency and certain dense urban areas, comprising 51% of local governments,
were exempted from DRI review.18
Building on earlier devolution waves, the tsunami of Weitz’s prescient
fourth wave hit Florida shores with adoption of the 2011 Community Planning
Act (CPA).19 The act’s overall purpose was to strengthen local government’s
role, processes and powers and to focus the state’s role on protecting important
state resources and facilities. Passage was fueled by concern the state program
overreached and was bloated with stultifying processes that unnecessarily delayed
decisions and produced unacceptable private sector costs. Against the backdrop of
a severe economic downturn, these concerns attracted the attention of a new state
administration intent on promoting economic development, producing new jobs,
cutting back state regulations and a Legislature that shared similar goals.
Executive branch champions and the bipartisan legislative coalition that had
enacted and supported an energetic state growth management role was long gone
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from the capitol. Additionally, the GMA had been amended regularly and
accumulated irrelevant provisions that were ripe for review and possible revision.
Separately in 2011, to underscore the new administration’s commitment to
economic development, the Department of Community Affairs, the state land
planning agency which administered the GMA, was abolished and the program
moved into a division of the new Department of Economic Opportunity, the
DEO.20
Unlike prior major revisions to the state planning framework, the 2011 act
was not the product of thorough, deliberate evaluation of program goals and
results by a broad based group of knowledgeable members and informed by
extensive public input. Instead, it was largely developed and promoted by a
relatively small group of state officials and lobbyists with the strong support of a
new state administration. Its enactment continues to generate controversy and
strong sentiment. It has been praised as long overdue reform that simplified a
complex, burdensome intergovernmental program and returns major planning
responsibility and accountability to local government. 21 It has also been excoriated
as a wholesale retreat from sound planning practice that cuts the heart out of a
reasonably effective program that did not require the major surgery it received. 22
There is some validity to both views, but I do not believe it is productive
to re-fight the battles over the CPA’s enactment; it is law and will be judged on its
results. Moreover, and importantly, since its passage there has been no
discernable interest in the executive and legislative branches to change course.
The most impactful and contentious part of the act is its effect on the
state’s oversight role.23 The CPA retained a state oversight role, but it is
markedly reduced. The 2011 act builds on the 2007 alternative review program
and applies its expedited process to most proposed plan amendments. Under
expedited review, DEO and other state and regional agencies may review and
comment on proposed local plan amendments for any potential adverse impacts to
important state resources or facilities. Review comments are limited to the subject
area of each agency’s jurisdiction. DEO may challenge a local action only if it
determines there will be an adverse impact primarily based on received agency
comments.24 To date, DEO has not commented on any of these amendments. 25
Another review process, coordinated review, provides more expansive
state compliance review and applies to larger scale amendments and required
local plan updates. Like expedited review, coordinated review considers agency
comments on potential adverse impacts to important state resources and facilities.
It also may consider various statutory planning policies applicable to proposed
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local plan amendments.26
DEO may issue objections, recommendations and
comments and find a proposed amendment not in compliance with state law if an
amendment may adversely impact an important state resource or facility.
Since enactment of the 2011 act, DEO has reviewed thousands of
proposed local amendments; it has found four proposed amendments not in
compliance with state standards.27 The agency initiated a formal noncompliance
proceeding in one case and all four cases were resolved through negotiation. 28
DEO’s implementation of the CPA to date reflects a strong desire to
largely defer to local government planning decisions and responsibility and to
amicably resolve and accommodate any differences with local decisions. This
track record implements a priority of the past administration to minimize state
regulations and the administrative reality that the state planning program now is
housed in a department primarily dedicated to promoting its eponymous economic
opportunity mission. It also evidences a key characteristic of Weitz’s fourth wave,
enhanced intergovernmental collaboration. In sum, accommodating oversight plus
2011 CPA amendments that devolved more authority to local government are
clearly accomplishing prime CPA goals to strengthen local governments’ role and
power vis-a-vis the state, grant localities more implementation flexibility, and
expedite review and adoption of proposed plan amendments.
But what about the CPA’s other major goal, protecting important state
resources and facilities against adverse impacts? To be clear, I believe this
focused state role is appropriate and provides the policy driver, foundation and the
core justification for state compliance oversight. However, effective oversight is
hampered and diluted by key CPA provisions. I will address two of these
provisions.
First, the CPA’s fundamental terms, important state resources and
facilities are not statutorily defined and DEO is not authorized to define or refine
these expansive terms by rule. Instead, for every proposed local plan amendment,
up to ten state and regional government agencies may review the amendment and
in the context of their statutory jurisdiction may determine what is an important
state resource and facility and whether the amendment would adversely impact
them.29 This entirely subjective, ad hoc identification and assessment policy
favors no one. Plan amendment applicants, local governments, and interested
citizens are all left to divine the situational preferences of the many reviewers;
there are no reliable rules for engagement.30 Regulatory unpredictability is
exacerbated by the reality that review agency policy preferences and interest in
the program can be expected to change materially as state officers, governing
body members and agency personnel cycle in and out of government. Lacking
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established substantive benchmarks, state executive officers and the Legislature
cannot appraise results and determine if the CPA’s seminal policies are being
achieved, and the courts, when asked to do so, cannot determine if state action
comports with legislative intent. Further, this open ended identification process is
legally fraught and vulnerable to constitutional and administrative law
challenges.31
RESOLUTION
The state requires local government to provide “meaningful, predictable
planning standards for use and development of land.” 32 It should apply this same
standard to its central oversight responsibility and amend the CPA accordingly.
Specifically, the Legislature should define the key terms and direct DEO to refine
the statutory definition and develop a rule that will particularly identify important
state resources and facilities.
The rule need not be exhaustive. A premium should be placed on
identifying resources and facilities that have compelling statewide importance. A
first step is to review state and regional review agency comments on prior
proposed amendments. This should be followed by an assessment of the scope
and effectiveness of current federal, state and regional planning, regulatory
permitting, funding and land purchase programs that could help identify
possible gaps the CPA land use focus can fill or a state interest it can complement
and promote.33 For example, resources could include certain environmentally rich
and vulnerable areas that are presently regulated by permits or subject to general
CPA directives but would benefit from greater state oversight of local plan land
use decisions. A priority should be coastal and riverine areas that are or are
reasonably expected to be impacted by sea level rise. 34 Another guidepost could
recognize state investments in resources and facilities, such as the state’s
significant financial contributions to cleaning Lake Okeechobee and restoring the
Everglades, 35 and the effective functioning of facilities, such as major state
funded highways and interchanges.
The rule should be adopted by the Governor and the elected state cabinet
and be subject to legislative review and approval at the next legislative session
following rule adoption.36 It’s time to do this. DEO has administered the CPA
since 2011. It has processed thousands of proposed local plan amendments. This
experience can provide a solid foundation for guidance that would direct, focus
and circumscribe the state’s oversight role and provide a measure of consistent
implementation and regulatory certainty for all participants in the plan review
process.
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Next, recall the state may find a proposed plan amendment not in
compliance with statutory standards. What happens if a local government disputes
a state compliance finding? If the challenge goes to hearing, the state carries a
heavy burden. To prevail, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that its
determination is correct.37 Clear and convincing means a finding can be made
with “a firm belief or conviction without hesitation about the matter in issue. “ 38
This is a much higher bar than the competent substantial evidence standard that
applies in Florida to almost all other administrative proceedings. 39
Why such a high bar for the state, especially in situations that call for a
subjective policy judgment without the benefit of definitive substantive
guidelines? Clear and convincing is not an appropriate standard in this context.
Moreover, it is a major disincentive for the state to perform its compliance
oversight role. The playing field should be evened; competent substantial
evidence is the right test when governments cannot agree and the CPA should be
amended accordingly.
CODA
Prior sustained executive branch and legislative efforts to reduce state
oversight and grant local governments more flexibility and discretion to manage
their growth culminated with passage of the CPA. The 2011 act is directionally
correct; the GMA was overdue for revision and a refocus of the state’s oversight
role on important state planning interests. However, the failure to define the core
CPA terms that form the basis for state review plus a very difficult standard for
state enforcement of its compliance decisions have significantly weakened the
state’s ability to perform its primary substantive role in the planning program,
oversight.40
If the state desires to retain an oversight role it should be meaningful and
must clearly identify the important state interests that justify state involvement in
local planning and development regulation decisions. If not, the CPA compliance
effort will continue to be viewed by many as a box checking exercise that simply
delays the effective date of locally approved plan amendments. This is a wasteful
use of public and private resources. Moreover, weak state engagement and
oversight will invite new efforts by growth management opponents to undermine
the remaining salient provisions of the act and to question the overall relevance of
a state oversight role.41
To paraphrase the ELMS II report, the state must reengage. State
leadership is necessary for Florida to address the many planning issues of state
importance that relentless growth continues to impose on already stressed
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facilities and natural resources, including current and future deleterious effects of
sea level rise on our peninsular state. As part of this effort, the CPA should be
revised to produce clear guidelines to enable consistent administration by
government, provide performance direction for citizens, and establish standards to
assess program achievement for all parties, the Legislature and the courts.
Florida’s Odyssean state planning program provides a several decades
case study of an almost continuous intergovernmental battle for power to regulate
land development. It merits consideration by any state seeking to sustain or join
“the quiet revolution in land use controls. “ The program has experienced
revolution, evolution and devolution; it’s time for resolution that will provide a
stable, sustainable program. The odyssey continues.
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impacts.
41. For example, Laws of Florida, ch. 2019-165, sec. 7, codified at Fla. Stat. sec.
163.3215(8)(c)(2019), provides a prevailing party in a judicial challenge to a
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enforcement
of
the
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